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Abstract
Blockchains are publicly viewable and theoretically unalterable records of bitcoin transac-
tions. They are thus crucial to the functionality of cryptocurrencies. Through the blockchain,
bitcoin algorithmically decentralizes the maintenance of the transaction ledger and delegates the
task to users on its network.
Blockchain technology shows promise beyond cryptocurrency: banking and financial institutions
have established partnerships with fintech firms to explore the applicability of blockchains in cap-
ital markets. Blockchains, used in conjunction with self-executing smartcontracts, present par-
ticularly compelling opportunities in derivatives markets, which are typically beset by numerous
intermediaries. The blockchain could radically reinvent the existing market infrastructure. Certain
intermediaries like central counterparties could become redundant or see abbreviated functional-
ity. If this happens, the current body of derivatives laws and regulations would need to be amended
to reflect these changes.
This Note examines the blockchain’s functionality and its applicability to derivatives markets.
It discusses the current state of derivatives regulation, including the mandatory clearing mandate
imposed by Title VII of Dodd-Frank. This Note argues that the current regulatory scheme is un-
derpinned by a need to reduce the systemic risks posed by derivatives and that the new regulatory
blueprint for blockchain derivatives markets should consequently be motivated by a reduction of
the systemic risks inherent in the technology itself.
KEYWORDS: Blockchains, Bitcoin Transactions, Derivative Markets
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Blockchains are publicly viewable and theoretically unalterable 
records of bitcoin transactions. They are thus crucial to the 
functionality of cryptocurrencies. Through the blockchain, bitcoin 
algorithmically decentralizes the maintenance of the transaction 
ledger and delegates the task to users on its network.  
Blockchain technology shows promise beyond cryptocurrency: 
banking and financial institutions have established partnerships with 
fintech firms to explore the applicability of blockchains in capital 
markets. Blockchains, used in conjunction with self-executing smart-
contracts, present particularly compelling opportunities in derivatives 
markets, which are typically beset by numerous intermediaries. The 
blockchain could radically reinvent the existing market infrastructure. 
Certain intermediaries like central counterparties could become 
redundant or see abbreviated functionality. If this happens, the current 
body of derivatives laws and regulations would need to be amended 
to reflect these changes.  
This Note examines the blockchain’s functionality and its 
applicability to derivatives markets. It discusses the current state of 
derivatives regulation, including the mandatory clearing mandate 
imposed by Title VII of Dodd-Frank. This Note argues that the current 
regulatory scheme is underpinned by a need to reduce the systemic 
risks posed by derivatives and that the new regulatory blueprint for 
blockchain derivatives markets should consequently be motivated by 
a reduction of the systemic risks inherent in the technology itself. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It has been seven years since a person (or persons), writing under the 
pseudonym Satoshi Nakamoto, proposed a radical plan for a decentralized 
and completely digital currency.1  Nakamoto’s opus, published as the 
world’s financial markets reeled from one of the worst crises in recent 
memory, envisioned a structure where the systems typically monopolized 
by sophisticated intermediaries could be crowdsourced to members on a 
common network. 2  Bitcoin captured the imaginations of those who 
yearned for a more egalitarian economy. Free from government control, 
                                                                                                                                                     
 1. See generally SATOSHI NAKAMOTO, BITCOIN: A PEER-TO-PEER ELECTRONIC 
CASH SYSTEM (2008), http://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf [https://perma.cc/4CHK-MUNP]. 
For years, journalists have speculated on Nakamoto’s true identity. Suspects have 
included a model train collector from Los Angeles and, most recently, an Australian 
computer scientist. See James Titcomb, Satoshi Nakamoto, Whoever That Is, Will Not 
Rescue Bitcoin, TELEGRAPH (May 8, 2016), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2016 
/05/08/satoshi-nakamoto-whoever-that-is-will-not-rescue-bitcoin [https://perma.cc/FE8 
Q-3PZ9]. 
 2. See generally NAKAMOTO, supra note 1. 
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Bitcoin separated economic liberties from political ones.3 Anyone with 
access to an internet connection can access Bitcoins. Yet amidst these 
lofty aspirations, Bitcoin suffered numerous setbacks, from wild price 
fluctuations4 to the infamous Mt. Gox5 and Silk Road6 scandals. Many 
question whether Bitcoin can expand beyond a niche, tech-savvy user-
base.7 While Bitcoin is still a prominent payment system, new fintech 
startups are instead homing in on its underlying technology, the 
blockchain. Indeed, “blockchain” is somewhat of a buzzword in the 
finance industry these days. Since 2014, venture capital firms have 
invested more than $1.2 billion into blockchain startups.8 Wall Street’s 
traditional firms find themselves working alongside upstart fintech 
companies to apply the technology to today’s capital markets.9 
                                                                                                                                                     
 3. See ALEX TAPSCOTT & DON TAPSCOTT, BLOCKCHAIN REVOLUTION: HOW THE 
TECHNOLOGY BEHIND BITCOIN IS CHANGING MONEY, BUSINESS, AND THE WORLD 6 
(2016). 
 4. See WINKLEVOSS INDEX, http://winkdex.com [https://perma.cc/MZT2-XKFC] 
(providing historical bitcoin pricing data). When dealing with foreign exchange rates, 
bitcoin is commonly abbreviated “BTC.” See id. One of the biggest spikes in the 
BTC/USD exchange rate was in 2013; it began the year at 1 BTC=13.45 USD. See id. By 
early December, the exchange rate had reached its historical high, where 1 BTC roughly 
equaled 1140 USD. See id. Observers cite several reasons for the spike, including a bank 
bailout in Cyprus that led worried depositors to seek safe havens. See Maureen Farrell, 
Bitcoin Prices Surge Post-Cyprus Bailout, CNN MONEY (Mar. 28, 2013), http://money. 
cnn.com/2013/03/28/investing/bitcoin-cyprus [https://perma.cc/T493-TCHJ]. 
 5. See Robert McMillan, The Inside Story of Mt. Gox, Bitcoin’s $460 Million 
Disaster, WIRED (Mar. 3, 2014), http://www.wired.com/2014/03/bitcoin-exchange [https 
://perma.cc/2SQQ-EUGN]. Mt. Gox was the biggest Bitcoin exchange in the world until 
more than $460 million in digital currency disappeared from beneath management’s nose. 
Id. 
 6. See Joshua Bearman & Tomer Hanuka, The Rise & Fall of Silk Road, WIRED 
(Apr. 2015), http://www.wired.com/2015/04/silk-road-1 [https://perma.cc/6EA4-NS 
RZ]. Bitcoin was implicated in the Silk Road affair because users paid for illicit goods 
using the currency. See id. 
 7. See Zoe Thomas, Does Bitcoin Still Matter?, BBC (May 6, 2016), http://www. 
bbc.com/news/technology-36197703 [https://perma.cc/6548-VZ5U]. 
 8. For a list of blockchain venture capital projects, see Blockchain Venture Capital, 
COINDESK, http://www.coindesk.com/bitcoin-venture-capital [https://perma.cc/QC8T-X 
X7J]. 
 9. One such venture is the Hyperledger Project, a collaborative research and 
development effort between tech companies and financial institutions led by the Linux 
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At their core, blockchains are about trust and transparency among 
unknown peers in the absence of mutually agreed upon intermediaries.10 
Upon first glance, it seems paradoxical that an industry that thrives on 
information asymmetries and market gatekeeping would be so eager to 
embrace the technology. However, the potential for blockchains to reduce 
transaction costs gives firms reason to believe that the future could hold 
truly “frictionless” transactions. 11  While there is great potential for 
blockchains to create new efficiencies, regulators must remain on top of 
this emergent technology. In derivatives markets, regulators are 
especially cognizant of systemic risks that can be transmitted across the 
entire economy through tangled webs of connected obligations. On one 
hand, blockchains can contribute to the reduction of systemic risks by 
crowdsourcing tasks typically conducted by large central counterparties 
that assume large amounts of risk.12  At the same time, the nature of 
blockchain technology can create systemic risks of a completely different 
character.13 
Introducing the blockchain into derivatives markets can distribute 
processes typically undertaken by a central counterparty (“CCP”). While 
this can produce efficiencies, decentralized systems are not insusceptible 
to exploitation by users on the network. The technology itself can serve 
as a source of market-wide risk. This Note argues that applying 
blockchains to derivatives markets requires regulators to rethink 
assumptions about centralization and systemic risks. Part I describes the 
function of blockchains, discusses the core processes in derivatives 
trades, and explains how blockchains can apply to the markets. Part II 
highlights the legal framework governing derivatives trades, focusing 
mainly on the central clearing mandate imposed by Title VII of Dodd-
Frank. Part III argues that central clearing presents systemic risks in the 
form of over-centralization, and that while blockchains can mitigate these 
                                                                                                                                                     
foundation. See HYPERLEDGER, https://www.hyperledger.org [https://perma.cc/G5PV-
86GB]. 
 10. See generally Sarah Underwood, Blockchain Beyond Bitcoin, COMM. ACM, 
Nov. 2016, at 15. 
 11. See IBM, BLOCKCHAIN–BUILDING FRICTIONLESS ECOSYSTEMS 4 (2016). 
 12. See infra Part III. 
 13. See infra Part III. 
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risks to some extent, regulators must tailor any new blockchain-centric 
policies to the unique market-wide risks posed by the technology. 
I. APPLYING BLOCKCHAINS TO DERIVATIVES MARKETS 
A. BUT WHAT IS A BLOCKCHAIN, REALLY? 
Those who have heard even a fraction of the industry enthusiasm 
might be led to believe that blockchains are elixirs to all the world’s 
problems. In part, this is because the most ambitious blockchain 
visionaries consider its large-scale applications beyond finance.14 Some 
even suggest that blockchains possess sufficient verification mechanisms 
to run entire systems of direct democracy, where citizens can securely 
vote from a smartphone or other connected device.15 The suggestion is 
astounding, especially in a political climate where allegations of voter 
fraud and political hacking have become matters of national salience. 
How, then, can a blockchain overcome fundamental issues of trust? 
Ultimately, blockchain is a development in information 
technology. 16  Many enterprises, whether in financial services or 
otherwise, need to store important information as data on a central server. 
Blockchains can overcome some weaknesses inherent to centralized data 
storage. Centralized storage provides a single point of failure that, if 
compromised, can harm a business. Most prominently, central servers are 
easy targets for malicious hackers to exploit.17 Sometimes, companies 
hold sensitive consumer and employee information on central servers that 
                                                                                                                                                     
 14. See Nina Kilbride, Self-Driving Vehicles and Smart Contracts via the 
Blockchain, CRYPTOCOINS NEWS (Apr. 1, 2016), https://www.cryptocoinsnews.com/self-
driving-vehicles-and-smart-contracts-blockchain/ [https://perma.cc/YVD6-JLWM].  
Outside of finance, blockchains show promise when use in conjunction with “Internet of 
Things” technology. See id. 
 15. See generally PHILIP BOUCHER, WHAT IF BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY 
REVOLUTIONISED VOTING? (2016), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATA 
G/2016/581918/EPRS_ATA(2016)581918_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/RXS3-Q4NW]. 
 16. See MELANIE SWAN, BLOCKCHAIN: BLUEPRINT FOR A NEW ECONOMY (2006). 
 17. See What is Blockchain Technology? A Step-by-Step Guide for Beginners, 
BLOCKGEEKS, http://blockgeeks.com/guides/what-is-blockchain-technology [https://per 
ma.cc/36AL-WWCC]. 
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are subject to dubious data protection standards.18 Hackers can then leak 
information online, forcing the affected company to incur reputational 
and financial costs to repair the damage.19 Less dramatically, the system 
can be subject to bottlenecks or crashes if too many users access it at the 
same time. 
In addition, a centralized system may be inefficient for organizations 
that must constantly modify and monitor arrangements with other parties. 
Consider an arrangement among a supplier, a buyer, and the bank 
effectuating payment. Each of these entities may need to collaborate on 
different aspects of the transaction. One of the hallmarks of centralized 
databases, however, is that only one copy of a record exists at a time. To 
borrow a simple, but apt, analogy by venture capitalist William 
Mougayar, this is the equivalent of two parties attempting to draft a 
contract by making revisions in Microsoft Word. 20  In comparison, 
blockchains are analogous to Google Docs. 21  With Google Docs, 
collaborating parties can grant permissions authorizing others to access 
or edit a document.22 
A blockchain is a distributed ledger, where every participant on a 
network has the same copy of a record. 23  Blockchain networks are 
continually reconciled, meaning that the blockchain updates itself roughly 
                                                                                                                                                     
 18. See Peter Elkind, Inside the Hack of the Century, FORTUNE (June 25, 2015), 
http://fortune.com/sony-hack-part-1 [https://perma.cc/7M74-Y6PT]. Fortune’s three- 
part investigation delved into the infamous 2014 cyber-attack on Sony Pictures. See id. 
The attack compromised personal information of employees and embarrassing internal 
emails concerning ongoing movie negotiations. See id. While Sony maintained that its 
defenses were adequate, the article suggests that it failed to implement basic safeguards. 
See id. More concerning is the fact that inadequate data protection is not atypical, as 
experts say that “outmoded [cybersecurity] practices are the norm at far too many 
companies.” Id. 
 19. See, e.g., Ingrid Lunden, Target Says Credit Card Data Breach Cost It $162M 
in 2013-14, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 25, 2015), https://techcrunch.com/2015/02/25/target-
says-credit-card-data-breach-cost-it-162m-in-2013-14 [https://perma.cc/4PPM-2HDA]. 
 20. See William Mougayar, Explaining the Blockchain via a Google Docs Analogy, 
STARTUP MGMT. BLOG (Sept. 6, 2016), http://startupmanagement.org/2016/09/06/explai 
ning-the-blockchain-via-a-google-docs-analogy [https://perma.cc/BP6Q-ZRNB]. 
 21. See id. 
 22. See id. 
 23. See What is Blockchain Technology, supra note 17. 
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every ten minutes to reflect changes that occurred since the last update.24 
Because every participant on the network has an equally viable and 
current version of the ledger from which to work, the entire enterprise 
need not cease to function if a central database fails; if one participant 
loses its record for some reason, everyone else can keep going.25 
The specific operation of the blockchain differs among various 
types—Ethereum’s blockchain may differ from IBM’s—but the guiding 
principles remain the same. The blockchain itself serves as a record of 
information.26 Network participants verify the transactions by their peers, 
but only rightful asset holders have cryptographic keys to their accounts.27 
When an asset holder transacts on the blockchain, it proposes an 
amendment to the ledger, and the rest of the network verifies that the 
transaction is legitimate.28 By these methods, the members of the network 
need not trust one another as long as they trust the computing process. To 
understand the details of how the process works, consider the 
blockchain’s first and most successful application: Bitcoin. 
B. BITCOINS, BLOCKCHAINS, AND SMART CONTRACTS 
Initially, blockchains were not designed for use with securities, 
derivatives, or traditional capital markets. Instead, they were integral to 
the functionality of digital currencies, most notably Bitcoin. 29  By 
removing intermediaries from payment clearing, cryptocurrencies 
                                                                                                                                                     
 24. See id. 
 25. See id. 
 26. See Casey C. Sullivan, How Blockchain Could Improve Record Keeping, 
FINDLAW (Mar. 22, 2017), http://blogs.findlaw.com/technologist/2017/03/how-block 
chain-could-improve-legal-record-keeping.html [https://perma.cc/62BE-EA5C]. The  
blockchain’s record-keeping functions can have serious implications for legal 
professionals. See id. 
 27. See William Mougayar, Understanding the Blockchain, O’REILLY (Jan. 17, 
2015), https://www.oreilly.com/ideas/understanding-the-blockchain [https://perma.cc/6 
D9V-XCX2]. 
 28. See NAKAMOTO, supra note 1, at 2. 
 29. Today, there are dozens of cryptocurrencies that use some variant on blockchain 
technology. See, e.g., LITECOIN, https://litecoin.org [https://perma.cc/R76Z-BDP4]; 
DOGECOIN, http://dogepay.com [https://perma.cc/9XGV-HXP5]. 
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promised to remove the main gatekeepers to sources of capital.30 When 
computers solve the cryptographic puzzles, they prove the veracity of the 
pending transactions. The blockchains are thus integral to Bitcoin’s 
viability. 
The early stage of blockchain functionality is often referred to as 
“Blockchain 1.0.”31 Recently, however, finance firms have recognized the 
potential efficiencies they could realize if they employed blockchains 
outside of just cryptocurrencies. The era of “Blockchain 2.0” envisions 
wider acceptance of the technology across the financial sector.32 Having 
seen the benefits that decentralization affords cryptocurrencies, many on 
Wall Street believe that blockchains can streamline existing market 
processes and create massive cost savings and efficiencies.33 
To understand how blockchains work and the benefits they provide, 
it is useful to begin with Blockchain 1.0. While there exist many different 
cryptocurrencies, this Note focuses on the two most popular: Bitcoin and 
Ethereum. Bitcoin is the most popular cryptocurrency and the progenitor 
of blockchains. Thus, there is a large body of work on Bitcoin’s 
functionality. Ethereum is the second most prevalent cryptocurrency and 
has become a prominent part of “Blockchain 2.0,” thanks to its 
implementation of automated, customizable smart contracts. 
1. Bitcoin’s Underlying Technology 
Transactions that occur in person are straightforward. One party sells 
an item of value, and its counterparty pays for the item in cash. The party 
                                                                                                                                                     
 30. One of Bitcoin’s earliest promises was the potential for “microfinance.” See 
Bitcoinist.net, ProudSource Puts New Spin on Bitcoin Peer-to-peer Lending, INSIDE 
BITCOINS (June 5, 2016), http://insidebitcoins.com/news/proudsource-puts-new-spin-on-
bitcoin-peer-to-peer-lending/32988 [https://perma.cc/T9G5-DE4A]. Because  
intermediaries require transacting fees, it is not profitable for traditional lending 
institutions to issue small loans to certain populations. By using blockchains as 
intermediaries instead, cryptocurrency enthusiasts suggest that peer-to-peer lending 
could be a possibility, though there are some obstacles. See id. 
 31. See, e.g., SWAN, supra note 16. 
 32. See id. 
 33. See Robert Hackett, Big Business Giants from Microsoft to J.P. Morgan Are 
Getting Behind Ethereum, FORBES (Feb. 27, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/02/28/ethere 
um-jpmorgan-microsoft-alliance/ [https://perma.cc/TK6H-CAJW]. 
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receiving the cash payment can easily confirm the veracity of the 
transaction. Ensuring that the money exists and is in the appropriate 
amount is merely a matter of counting bills. Once money has been spent 
on something, it is, regretfully, gone for good. 
Today, simple cash transactions are less commonplace than they 
were in the past. This is not a shocking revelation, as the Internet has 
displaced cash transactions for years, and credit cards have done the same 
for decades. What may be more surprising is the pervasiveness of asset 
digitization and its status as a preferred payment method. With Venmo, 
for example, users with a bank account or credit card can transfer 
electronic funds to one another with their smartphones.34 Some European 
countries are even attempting to forsake cash altogether: in Denmark, a 
pending law would allow some merchants to reject cash payments, while 
Norway aims to become completely cash-free by 2020.35 
The digitization of cash, while convenient, presents challenges 
regarding transaction verification. Coders call this the “double spending 
problem”: if money amounts to ones and zeroes, what is stopping an 
opportunistic buyer from copying the code and sending it to multiple 
parties, as one would do to a common image or document file?36 With the 
blockchain, Bitcoin addressed the double spending problem in a unique 
way: it removed the intermediaries that are usually crucial to digital 
spending platforms and crowdsourced the task to members of the 
network.37 Though the parties on the network do not know one another 
and thus have no reason to trust one another, they all accept the code as 
the ultimate arbiter of truth. Transaction verification on the blockchain 
involves a communal search for the truth; once a user finds the correct 
values, the network universally adopts this as the true account of a 
transaction.38 
                                                                                                                                                     
 34. See VENMO, https://venmo.com/about/product/ [https://perma.cc/BL67-QCK4]. 
 35. See Is Cash an Endangered Species?, BNP PARIBAS (Aug. 14, 2015), https://gro 
up.bnpparibas/en/news/cash-endangered-species [https://perma.cc/7JTW-XDAB]. 
 36. See TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, supra note 3, at 10. 
 37. See Matt Reynolds, Cash, Fear, and Uncertainty: The Holy Trinity of Bitcoin 
and Blockchain, REGISTER (Apr. 12, 2016), https://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/04/12/bit 
coin_blockchain/ [https://perma.cc/ZB5D-5WBH]. 
 38. See generally Leslie Lamport, Robert Shostak & Marshall Pease, The Byzantine 
Generals Problem, 4 ACM TRANSACTIONS ON PROGRAMMING LANGUAGE & SYS. 382 
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The Bitcoin blockchain manufactures trust by creating a proof of 
work problem.39 To verify a transaction, computers on the network must 
produce a particular set of data.40 To do so, they solve an algorithmic 
problem. 41  The problem is computationally tedious; there is no 
mathematical “shortcut,” no way to cut corners, and users must expend 
resources (time, computing power, hardware costs, electricity) to solve 
it.42 While the problem is difficult for systems to solve, it should be easy 
for members on the network to check transactions against the public 
ledger.43 
To understand how proof of work blockchains operate, consider the 
anatomy of a simple Bitcoin transaction. Suppose that Alice wants to pay 
Bob.44 Both Alice and Bob have wallets on their computers, which store 
                                                                                                                                                     
(1982). See also Bitcoin and the Byzantine Generals Problem, WEUSECOINS (July 13, 
2015), https://www.weusecoins.com/bitcoin-byzantine-generals-problem/ [https://perm 
a.cc/MG59-NDVW]. In computer science lingo, the underlying issue that the blockchain 
aims to prevent is known as the Byzantine Generals’ Problem. See id. Imagine the 
Byzantine army laying siege to a city. The city is surrounded by different Byzantine 
legions, each commanded by a different general. There is disagreement about the best 
course of action. Some generals want to attack the city, while others want to retreat. 
Whatever the decision, it is important that the action is universally agreed upon, since a 
half-hearted strategy would result in more casualties than a unified attack or retreat. The 
issue is complicated by traitorous generals who may strategically cast conflicting votes 
to maximize casualties. There are also communication difficulties, since the generals’ 
messengers may be killed before communicating a vote. Bitcoin and other decentralized 
networks face this problem. See id. The network functions only if all parties are able to 
agree on the veracity of a transaction. See id. Any disagreements pertaining to the true 
state of affairs undermines confidence in the system. See id. The point of the code is for 
the network to resolve any differences in the verifying systems’ “opinions” of a 
transaction. See id. 
 39. See Daniel Krawisz, The Proof of Work Concept, SATOSHI NAKAMOTO INST. 
(June 24, 2013), http://nakamotoinstitute.org/mempool/the-proof-of-work-concept/ [http 
s://perma.cc/N2JH-K6LC]; see also Khan Academy, Bitcoin–Proof of Work, YOUTUBE 
(May 1, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9V1bipPkCTU. 
 40. See Krawisz, supra note 39. 
 41. See id. 
 42. See id. 
 43. See id. 
 44. The Alice and Bob hypothetical is commonly used to describe bitcoin 
transactions. See, e.g., How Do Bitcoin Transactions Work?, COINDESK (Mar. 20, 2015), 
www.coindesk.com/information/how-do-bitcoin-transactions-work [https://perma.cc/JL 
6V-XFZU]. 
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information pertaining to their Bitcoin addresses.45 Visually, an address 
is a string of letters and numbers, but each address has its own Bitcoin 
balance.46 To accept payment, Bob creates a new address.47 Alice tells the 
Bitcoin client that she wants to send payment to Bob’s new address.48 
Had Alice and Bob kept traditional books and records, recording the 
transaction would be simple: Alice’s books would record the transaction 
as a credit and Bob’s books would contain a corresponding debit. 49 
Recordation into the blockchain ledger, however, requires a third entry—
a cryptographic seal.50 To do this, Bitcoin uses public key cryptography.51 
Both Alice and Bob have addresses that they can disseminate publicly.52 
Additionally, Alice and Bob both have private keys, which are kept secret 
and derived from their addresses through a cryptographic sequence.53 To 
facilitate payment, Bob gives Alice his address, which serves as a public 
key.54 Alice then authorizes the transaction by “signing” the transfer with 
her private key and pairing it with Bob’s public key.55 
Once the deal is consummated, the transaction request is broadcast 
to the network for verification.56 Miners are participants on the Bitcoin 
network who verify transactions for entry onto the blockchain.57 Miners 
verify transactions by matching the private key signature to the 
transferor’s publicly viewable address. 58  They periodically bundle 
                                                                                                                                                     
 45. See id. 
 46. See BLOCKCHAIN, https://blockchain.info [https://perma.cc/3R5A-36JW]. 
Blockchain.info is the publicly viewable Bitcoin blockchain. Simply click on a block to 
see the recent transactions that compose the block. Each transaction appears to be 
between two random alpha-numeric strings—these are the addresses. 
 47. See How Do Bitcoin Transactions Work?, supra note 44. 
 48. See id. 
 49. See id. 
 50. See id. 
 51. See id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. See SWAN, supra note 16. 
 54. See How Do Bitcoin Transactions Work?, supra note 44.  
 55. See id. 
 56. See id. 
 57. See id. 
 58. See BITCOINMINING.COM, https://www.bitcoinmining.com/ [https://perma.cc/32 
LY-HWLF]. 
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pending transaction data into blocks. 59  At that point, the miners’ 
computers must solve the proof of work problem to essentially convert 
the raw transaction data into a form that is useful for systems accessing 
the blockchain.60 
The proof of work problem requires miners to undergo a process 
called cryptographic hashing.61 Hashing is an integral concept behind 
blockchain.62 Any data set can be run through a hashing algorithm that 
produces a hash value, a unique alphanumeric string. 63  Even small 
changes to the input data can produce radically different hashes.64 There 
is no way for a user to predict what hash a data set may produce without 
running it through the algorithm.65 Ultimately, miners want to produce a 
hash that is beneath a certain target value set by the network.66  The 
blockchain determines the target value to adjust the difficulty of the proof 
of work problem. 67  As more miners participate in the transaction 
verification process, the total processing power on the network 
increases.68 The Bitcoin chain adjusts the target value to reflect these 
changes; by creating a lower target value, the blockchain decreases the 
number of viable solutions to a proof of work problem, making it more 
difficult.69 To solve the proof of work problem, miners will use three 
pieces of data as inputs for the hashing algorithm: the transaction block 
they just formed, the hash from the previous block on the blockchain, and 
                                                                                                                                                     
 59. See id. 
 60. See id. 
 61. The Disruptor Series: Digital Currency and Blockchain Technology: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. of Commerce, Manufacturing & Trade of the H. Comm. on Energy 
& Commerce, 114th Cong. 47 (2016) (testimony by Paul Snow, Chief Architect and Co-
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 63. See id. 
 64. See id. 
 65. See id. 
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it wants to limit how many Bitcoins are in circulation. See FAQ, BITCOIN, 
https://bitcoin.org/en/faq [https://perma.cc/LZ3M-TQ7Z]; see also Krawisz, supra note 
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 68. See id. 
 69. See id. 
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an arbitrary number called a nonce.70 A nonce is a variable, while the 
other inputs are constants. By changing the nonce, miners can produce 
different hash values even if the other input data remains the same.71 
At this point, the grunt work begins. Miners will expend resources to 
find a nonce that will produce a hash that is beneath the target value.72 
They compete against one another in this endeavor, motivated by the 
promise of a Bitcoin bounty to the first miner to find an acceptable hash. 
The process is computationally tedious.73 It is akin to plugging in values 
for variables in algebraic equations until happening upon the correct 
solution. 74  Unlike simple algebra, however, there is no formula or 
shortcut that simply “solves for x.” The only way for miners to get an edge 
over the others is to purchase specialized hardware or mine in collective 
pools to increase the rate at which their systems run through the hashing 
algorithm.75 While this helps, stumbling upon the correct hash value is 
still a matter of probability.76 
When a miner finds the solution to the proof of work problem, it 
broadcasts the completed block to all the nodes on the network.77 Nodes 
are connected systems that accept blocks by checking them against the 
network’s acceptance criteria; if the block shows a double-spent coin, for 
example, the node will reject the block.78 A node accepts a block by using 
the hash value of the completed block as the header for the next block in 
the chain.79 Nodes always accept the longest chain of blocks to be the 
network’s “truth.”80 If a node receives conflicting blocks, it will begin 
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working on the one it receives first.81 It saves the conflicting block, as 
other nodes also begin work on whichever one they receive first.82 The 
node will switch to the block that becomes longer and more widely 
accepted.83 
There are variations to this formula, but the proof of work 
mechanism was the initial model posed by Nakamoto and is still 
employed by Bitcoin. Most blockchains operate on some derivation of 
this formula, and the Bitcoin blockchain demonstrates the basic precepts 
of communal payment verification. 
2. From Cash to Securities: Smart Contracts 
Smart contracts are crucial in guiding the transition from Blockchain 
1.0 to Blockchain 2.0. The term “smart contract” is a nebulous concept. 
As it is somewhat of a marketing buzzword, it is often used as a catch-all 
term to describe a host of online activity. 84  Lawyer and computer 
programmer Nick Szabo first defined the term in 1994. Szabo described 
a smart contract as: 
[A] computerized transaction protocol that executes the terms of a 
contract. The general objectives . . . are to satisfy common contractual 
conditions (such as payment terms, liens, confidentiality, and even 
enforcement), minimize exceptions both malicious and accidental, 
and minimize the need for trusted intermediaries. Related economic 
goals include lowering fraud loss, arbitration and enforcement costs, 
and other transaction costs.85 
Much of the ambiguity surrounding smart contracts stems from the 
interplay between the traditional legal understanding of contracts and the 
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“smart” aspect of the code.86 Many online activities are governed by code 
and are legally relevant but lack the legal elements of contract 
formation.87 
Smart contracts rest on the idea that the code can enforce and execute 
the terms of the agreement. A smart contract is “self-enforcing” if the 
software executes the terms without additional input from the parties.88 
This allows an arrangement to occur even in the absence of trust.89 For 
example, Szabo considered a simple smart contract governing a car loan.90 
The loan’s terms are expressed in code and programmed into the car.91 
The contract no longer hinges on the debtor’s willingness to abide by its 
terms; if the debtor has the means to do so, the software ensures that he 
or she makes the payments.92 If the debtor cannot make the payments, the 
smart contract invokes a lien by revoking the debtor’s permission to start 
the ignition.93 This hypothetical loan also highlights the smart contract’s 
cost saving benefits. The bank does not need to devote manpower to 
constantly monitor the status of each loan and handle the paperwork 
required to invoke a traditional lien. It does not need to hire a debt 
collector, nor does it need to contend with the possibility that an 
unscrupulous repo man may expose it to additional liability. 
Szabo’s ideas were ahead of their time in the mid-1990s (though 
perhaps somewhat prophetic of today’s era of driverless cars). Most smart 
contracts, to this point, have not demonstrated quite the same ability to 
process inputs as Szabo envisioned. Their most common use has been in 
multimedia digital rights management (“DRM”).94 Purchasing or renting 
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content on iTunes or a comparable service amounts to acquiring a limited 
use license. For example, users can view rental content only over a limited 
period, they can access music only on a certain number of compliant 
devices, and they can burn audio playlists to CDs only a few times.95 
DRM arrangements achieve results without assuming monitoring 
and enforcement costs by making it impossible for users to violate the 
smart contract. Each song contains software that serves as the agreement’s 
monitoring mechanism.96 A movie rental, for example, is time stamped 
when the user begins watching it. After twenty-four hours, the software 
revokes the user’s ability to access the video.97 Yet DRM smart contracts 
are limited in their abilities. Unlike Szabo’s utopian agreements, iTunes 
DRM does not process inputs and cannot apply the contract’s terms.98 It 
thus has restricted functionality. Unlike simplistic DRM, smart contracts 
going forward can use the blockchain’s computational power and allocate 
the underlying assets once the agreement’s conditions are calculated and 
satisfied. 
Smart contracts uploaded to blockchains are programmed in code 
that embodies the “terms” of the agreement. In a way, the coded language 
of a smart contract is less obtuse than that of its written counterpart. To 
laypersons, traditional contracts evoke images of dense text walls, 
impenetrable legalese, and linguistic butchery designed to mitigate 
liability. But smart contracts reduce each term to its basic component in 
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the form of “if/then” statements.99 For all their programming complexity, 
it may be best to think of smart contracts as conditional payments.100 
The process by which a smart contract is uploaded to the blockchain 
varies across the different types of blockchains. Because smart contracts 
are customizable and can be used for a variety of purposes, it is 
advantageous to use a blockchain that supports a wide range of 
programming languages. Bitcoin’s chief competitor, Ethereum, was 
specifically designed for smart contracts, and thus permits users more 
freedom in drafting their programs.101 
The process of uploading a smart contract to the Ethereum 
blockchain is not dissimilar from the Bitcoin transacting process 
discussed earlier.102 The user does so through a transaction containing the 
smart contract’s code. 103  This special transaction does not go to the 
counterparty’s address, as with a normal Bitcoin transaction.104 Instead, 
nodes on the network recognize the smart contract and create a special 
address for it.105 The parties can later trigger the contract by sending a 
transaction request to the smart contract’s address that fulfills the 
conditions necessary for the contract’s execution.106 Triggering a smart 
contract can result in a chain reaction: it can automatically lead to another 
transaction request, which may trigger another smart contract, and the 
process can theoretically repeat itself an infinite number of times.107 This 
means that satisfying a single condition can trigger a series of smart 
contracts that are contingent on that obligation. 
There must then be a way for the blockchain to monitor these 
triggering conditions. The blockchain, however, cannot keep track of 
every parameter that can influence the activation of a contract. Multi-
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signatures and oracles resolve this problem by keeping track of 
information off the blockchain and providing a trusted signature once a 
condition to the contract is satisfied. 
As the name suggests, multi-signature (or multi-sig) allows for more 
than two parties to enter into an agreement. With a “2-of-3” contract, there 
are three parties to the agreement and the contract requires two parties to 
sign with their private keys.108 This can create escrows by allowing buyers 
to commit money to sellers and to third parties. If the parties consummate 
the transaction without issue, the buyer and seller sign the agreement, and 
the payment goes through. In the event of a dispute, the third party can 
arbitrate the dispute and release the funds.109 
Oracles use multi-sig to incorporate outside information into the 
blockchain. An oracle serves as an additional signatory that attests to 
information that is not tracked by the blockchain.110 It can reference an 
agreed upon data source and serve as an additional signature to a 
transaction that is contingent on a real-world event.111 Once the required 
condition is met, the oracle signs the transaction with its private key to 
effectuate the transaction.112 In a trading system that relies on numerous 
ledgers to keep track of different assets, the oracle can facilitate a payment 
that is contingent on a factor tracked by another blockchain. 
Smart contract technology is still very much in its early stages of 
development, so some of the advantages and disadvantages may not be 
clear yet. But even as of now, the technology is compelling enough to 
attract significant investment. 
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C. THE MODERN DERIVATIVES INDUSTRY 
While blockchains and smart contracts are at the cutting edge of 
finance, derivatives have existed for centuries.113 Some of the earliest 
credit derivatives date back to twelfth century Venice, when concerned 
financiers sought insurance against the possibility that overseas trading 
ships would get lost at sea.114 For most of recorded history, derivatives 
have been used as hedging mechanisms in commodities industries.115 
Contemporary derivatives agreements play an important role in the 
hedging strategies of banks and other financial institutions. Derivatives 
markets could be at the precipice of a major change, but there are risks 
inherent in the use of such instruments. 
There are several general types of derivatives. Forward agreements 
specify later delivery of a quantity of assets at an agreed upon price.116 
Futures are standardized forwards that are traded on an exchange.117 
Options give the holder a right, though not an obligation, to purchase the 
underlying asset at a specified price.118 Swaps involve exchanges of cash 
flows based on a notional amount named in the agreement. 119  Some 
complex instruments may involve a combination of the different 
archetypes. 
Derivatives trades can occur either through exchanges or over-the-
counter (“OTC”). 120  Exchange-traded derivatives must be highly 
standardized and liquid.121 Parties to these agreements have fewer choices 
regarding underlying assets, settlement amounts, maturity dates, and 
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other contractual terms.122 Centralized entities can provide credit support 
to ensure execution of the contract and can monitor trading practices.123 
Conversely, OTC derivatives are individually negotiated. They are often 
bespoke and designed to deal with very specific types of risks.124 Their 
terms are variable and consequently allow for limitless speculative or 
hedging potential.125 However, the specificity of these contracts often 
makes them illiquid.126 
1. Risks Associated with Derivatives Use 
Regardless of their type, a fundamental characteristic of derivatives 
is long-term risk.127 Regulators often say that they want to curtail risky 
practices, but this is a vague proposition when dealing with parties that 
quite literally trade in risk. A well-functioning derivatives market is thus 
concerned with mitigating unwanted risks.128 Counterparty risk, i.e., the 
risk that a counterparty will be unable to fulfill its end of the contract, is 
the greatest source of concern for market participants.129 As a form of 
credit risk, it measures the degree of exposure a firm has to the potential 
default of its counterparty.130 As counterparty risk is an inherent part of 
every derivative transaction, it is more difficult to hedge. 131  Market 
participants fear a domino effect in which the default of one counterparty 
results in defaults of others.132 Because firms will always assume some 
degree of counterparty risk in every trade, they tend to offset the risk by 
entering into cancelling transactions. 133  An unexpected default by a 
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counterparty to whom a firm is significantly exposed can cause previously 
neutralized risks to re-expose themselves. 134  That is to say, a 
counterparty’s default can upset the firm’s balanced position, causing a 
scenario where it must re-hedge the affected positions. If the whole 
market is suffering from extreme conditions, it may be impossible, or at 
least more expensive, to hedge. 
2. The Derivative Value Chain 
The value chain of a derivative can be divided into three general 
stages: pre-trading, trading and clearing, and execution and delivery.135 
Pre-trading involves originating and channeling orders to marketplaces.136 
During trading, buyers and sellers are matched with one another. 137 
Compatible counterparties may then execute the trade by entering into the 
derivatives contract.138 At this stage, the contracts are “open;” during the 
clearing process, open contracts can be managed and traded again 
throughout their maturity.139 In modern derivatives markets, the post-
trading management of the contracts is typically handled by a CCP.140 
Finally, once the agreement reaches maturity, the contract is “closed” 
either through a cash payment (which occurs in the majority of cases) or 
through physical delivery of the underlying asset.141 
Pre-trading begins with broker-dealers.142 In exchange-traded deals 
they originate orders from their customers and wire those orders to 
centralized exchanges called designated contract markets. 143  These 
designated contract markets include platforms like the Chicago Board of 
Trade or the New York Mercantile Exchange.144 Typically, with these 
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standard agreements, the only negotiable terms are the price terms in 
futures or options contracts and the cash delivery amounts in swaps.145 
Standardization makes these derivatives highly liquid,146 so the exchange 
generally has little difficulty in finding two parties that are willing to 
assume different sides of the transaction. 
In OTC markets, broker-dealers send the orders to their own 
derivatives desks or, if necessary, to other dealers. 147  For swap 
agreements, however, the orders are sent to swap execution facilities, 
which provide similar pre-trade bid and ask information as the 
exchanges. 148  Trading is bilateral; the terms may either resemble 
standardized agreements (“look-alikes”) or be specific to each party’s 
needs.149 In the latter scenario, the contract could be too illiquid for there 
to be a robust secondary market. 
Once the parties are matched and a trade is pending, CCPs clear the 
trade. CCPs are organizations that consist of member firms which attempt 
to reduce the impact of a default on derivative contract obligations.150 The 
CCP clears transactions by serving as the “buyer to every seller and the 
seller to every buyer.”151 The CCP inserts itself between both parties 
through a process called novation in which the two counterparties contract 
with the CCP instead of directly with one another.152 This creates two 
contracts: one between the first counterparty and the CCP, and an 
offsetting one between the CCP and the second counterparty. 153  The 
counterparties are thus not exposed to each other’s credit risk and are only 
concerned with the credit risk of the CCP. 
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Because the CCP absorbs all the counterparty risks on the market, it 
must guard against its own default through netting and collateralization.154 
Netting reduces the number of times cash changes hands.155 When two 
parties have several outstanding derivatives contracts with one another, 
there will be some winning deals and some losing deals.156 Rather than 
paying out each agreement individually, netting allows a party to subtract 
its losses from its gains and pay the net result. 157  CCPs engage in 
multilateral netting, which leads to movement consolidation among 
several clearing members.158 Additionally, when a clearing member first 
enters the transaction, the CCP collects an initial margin as a form of 
collateral. 159  The requested margin reflects the probability of the 
member’s default. 160  For example, NASDAQ’s margining model for 
commodities derivatives reflects a 99.2% probability that the margin will 
be sufficient to cover a default.161  CCPs also collect another type of 
margin called variation margin to adjust a position through the life of the 
trade.162  Variation margins can result in a transfer of funds from the 
member organization to the CCP (or vice versa), depending on the change 
in the instrument’s market value. 163  The combination of these 
requirements protects CCPs from both future and day-to-day losses. 
D. BLOCKCHAIN’S DISRUPTIVE POTENTIAL 
The derivatives industry is highly intermediated, and blockchain 
computation provides an opportunity for cost reductions and increased 
efficiencies. Goldman Sachs estimates that implementing blockchains in 
markets for cash securities can result in $11 billion to $12 billion in annual 
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savings to the banking industry, with additional savings if they were 
applied to derivatives markets.164 Banks could see similar reductions in 
costs of anti-money laundering and know-your-customer reporting.165 
There have already been small-scale test cases involving successful 
transfers of foreign exchange futures and credit-default swaps using 
blockchains.166 
A blockchain-based derivatives contract market would likely involve 
a system of several interoperable ledgers that use multi-sig smart 
contracts for effectuating transfers and oracles for asset monitoring and 
collateral management.167 Parties to a blockchain derivatives transaction 
would submit bids and asks as usual. In OTC markets, dealers could play 
a reduced role. Rather than relying on the dealers to match bids and asks, 
parties could take advantage of the anonymity provided by the 
blockchain, in the same way Bitcoin users do.168 They could upload asks 
directly to the blockchain and rely on its computing to automatically 
choose the highest bid. 169  Because of public-key cryptography, the 
publicly viewable addresses would serve as aliases that conceal 
identifying information of the counterparties. 
Once the parties are matched, CCPs would novate the agreements.170 
As with the current novation process, this would result in two contracts. 
The contracts are then uploaded to the derivatives ledger, which contains 
the logic and execution algorithms for all the clearing members’ 
agreements. 171  Posting margin to the CCP involves the use of 
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interoperable collateral and asset ledgers.172 Throughout the lifespan of 
the agreement, the collateral ledger uses oracles to reference agreed upon 
external data sources (like Bloomberg) to track price movements in the 
underlying assets and to automatically adjust positions.173 Rebalancing 
happens according to real time fluctuations, which means that collateral 
in margin accounts can be allocated more efficiently.174 Execution of the 
payments is automated; if additional margin is needed, the ledger 
automatically sends a payment request to the clearing member’s address 
on the asset ledger. 
There is some disagreement among industry stakeholders as to the 
degree to which blockchains can displace CCPs as intermediaries in 
derivatives trades. The blockchain’s verification mechanism threatens to 
eliminate CCPs in securities transactions. Blockchains ensure that both 
parties own the asset before the trade is consummated—this would work 
in largely the same way that a Bitcoin transaction works and can reduce 
counterparty risk without the presence of a CCP. But unlike with 
securities, there can be a substantial amount of time between the trade and 
settlement of a derivative. 175  Verifying the trade does not eliminate 
counterparty risk ten years down the road. 176  For this reason, many 
observers believe that CCPs will still be necessary to perform netting; if 
the blockchain is unable to net transactions, it could lead to higher 
collateral requirements across the board.177 Thus, there is some skepticism 
that market participants and regulators will abandon the tried and true 
                                                                                                                                                     
 172. Id. 
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“safety net” that CCPs provide. 178  Some are more hawkish on the 
blockchain’s displacement potential. 
On the other hand, blockchain optimists suggest that an improvised 
netting process can occur on the blockchain. For example, in a comment 
to the European Securities Market Authority, the International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association (“ISDA”) suggested that blockchains can 
consolidate trading information over a given period into a single 
aggregate movement.179 The blockchain can then lock margin accounts 
until they are funded appropriately.180 Some go a step further and suggest 
that the simplified settlement process sufficiently reduces counterparty 
risk, which makes netting unnecessary.181 This question will be resolved 
as the technology matures. Since CCPs provide clear benefits, 
blockchains must demonstrate clear efficiencies to displace the current 
system. 
Even if CCPs retain their functionality, blockchains still provide 
efficiencies by serving as platforms for data recording and reporting. 
Audits and other regulatory reporting become a pittance—and a potential 
boon for regulators.182 By serving as a full node on the blockchain, the 
concerned regulator would have a copy of the entire ledger, which 
includes information pertaining to every transaction, margin amounts, and 
the risk profiles of the participating firms. There needs to be some 
tinkering, though: regulators would require modified permissions or an 
identification system to de-anonymize the accounts on the blockchain, 
and key management, in general, would require great care. 183 
Furthermore, authorized parties have access to the smart contracts, which 
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serve as records of ownership and vital transaction information.184 The 
self-executing smart contracts can also eliminate the need for some 
dispute resolution procedures.185 The blockchain’s automation can yield 
reductions in transaction costs that firms usually incur when resolving 
contract disputes. 
The greatest potential for blockchains likely exists in markets where 
there is no CCP: illiquid, non-cleared OTC derivatives markets.186 In 
these markets, blockchains can assume functions typically undertaken by 
CCPs. But rather than relying on a single central counterparty, the 
blockchain serves as a decentralized clearing network (“DCN”).187 Firms 
trading these derivatives could use a blockchain like Ethereum, which 
allows users to organize into distributed autonomous organizations 
(“DAO”) governed by smart contracts.188 Once the criteria for admission 
into the DCN are met, the blockchain manages the functions usually 
conducted by the CCP: valuing contracts, calculating initial and variation 
margins, facilitating custody of collateral, handling novation and netting, 
and managing closeout.189 Derivatives are contracts that have calculable 
terms with an “algorithm” expressed through legal terms.190 Valuation 
typically presents a problem in bilateral markets because the two parties 
compute the algorithms themselves and may reach different conclusions 
on pricing.191 Blockchains crowdsource the calculations and allow the 
network to reach a consensus on their accuracy.192 Proponents hope that 
the communal process can result in more transparent OTC markets.193 
                                                                                                                                                     
 184. See MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 165, at 9. 
 185. See id. at 1, 8. 
 186. See Ian Rycott, What Every Trader Needs to Know About Blockchain, FI-DESK 
(Sept. 22, 2015), http://www.fi-desk.com/derivatives-blockchain/ [https://perma.cc/B57 
K-QKFM]. 
 187. See COMMODITIES FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, supra note 174, at 194-95. 
 188. See Distributed Autonomous Organization, ETHEREUM, https://www.ethereum.o 
rg/dao [https://perma.cc/QW9C-TW48]. 
 189. See COMMODITIES FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, supra note 174, at 195-96. 
 190. See id. at 196. 
 191. See id. at 196-97. 
 192. See id. at 197. 
 193. See William Shaw, EU Regulator Pushes for Transparency on Nonequity 
Options, LAW360 (Oct. 3, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/847315/eu-regulator-
pushes-for-transparency-on-nonequity-options [https://perma.cc/X7E7-LBA2]. 
284 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XXII 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
Despite their potential to realize new efficiencies, blockchains face 
barriers to implementation. A system that is completely reliant on the 
blockchain cannot guarantee payments if there is a flaw in contracting.194 
One major drawback is the lack of legal recourse for aggrieved parties.195 
Irrevocability is a central tenet to the blockchain. 196  It should be 
impossible for a single entity to “edit” an entry to the blockchain and 
reverse it as if it never happened.197 This can present a problem when 
attempting to enact a court-ordered remedy.198 While the smart contract 
will undoubtedly resolve some disputes, others will remain. A smart 
contract does little to remedy insider trading, and new disputes could arise 
if a party believes that the coded logic does not accurately reflect the 
agreed upon terms.199 
II. CURRENT LEGAL REGIMES GOVERNING BLOCKCHAINS AND 
DERIVATIVES 
A. THE CURRENT LEGAL LANDSCAPE ON BLOCKCHAINS 
Blockchain is still in its formative stages, and global regulators are 
still attempting to keep pace with fintech research in the private sector. 
The regulators’ roles in the new, decentralized future are still far from 
clear, so many foreign jurisdictions have adopted a “wait and see” 
approach to blockchain regulation. In these countries, financial regulators 
are wary of impeding blockchain’s technological development and 
instead work with industry stakeholders to ascertain the technology’s 
capabilities. 
The United Kingdom Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”) has 
adopted a particularly novel approach to blockchain regulation. The FCA 
has created “regulatory sandboxes” where “businesses [can] test 
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innovative products, . . . business models and delivery mechanisms.”200 
These sandboxes serve as closed environments where startups can test 
blockchain use without subjecting themselves to the entire suite of U.K. 
financial regulation.201 Rather than forcing blockchain startups to assume 
significant time and monetary costs to test new concepts in an uncertain 
regulatory environment, the FCA has established an abbreviated process 
through which approved entities can experiment with blockchains without 
suffering the full repercussions of failure. 
The FCA has determined several requirements for admission into the 
sandbox. An applicant firm must be within the scope of the sandbox’s 
objectives, demonstrate a clear innovation, deliver a consumer benefit, 
have a need for sandbox testing, and be ready for testing.202 Once the firm 
registers, it enjoys a more flexible interpretation of FCA rules; for 
example, the FCA can issue regulatory guidance on a case-by-case basis 
or even waive entire provisions depending on the parameters of a given 
test.203  The FCA believes that the relationship is mutually beneficial. 
While startups and their customers benefit from the certainty that their 
economic activity falls within legal boundaries, regulators obtain a wealth 
of information to use going forward.204 
Other international jurisdictions have adopted conciliatory 
regulations for blockchain startups. 205  The Hong Kong Monetary 
Authority (“HKMA”) has established its own sandbox to serve as a pilot 
for fintech advancements, such as blockchain, augmented reality, and 
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even robotics.206 The HKMA aims to provide regulatory flexibility while 
still requiring participant firms to consider consumer protection and risk 
mitigation. 207  The Australian Securities and Investment Commission 
(“ASIC”) created an “Innovation Hub,” which it touts as a collaborative 
effort between financial professionals, regulators, and academics. Like 
the FCA, ASIC cites the costs startups face when testing a concept in a 
large market.208 Fintech companies would normally need to register with 
ASIC to do business but would incur additional costs by modifying their 
business and registration status based on customer response.209  ASIC 
suggests that its flexible regulatory regime can mitigate the speed-to-
market problem. 210  Elsewhere in Asia, the Monetary Authority of 
Singapore (“MAS”) has actively courted small and large blockchain 
enterprises as part of the country’s broader Smart Nation initiative.211 For 
example, MAS collaborated with the multi-firm blockchain consortium 
R3 to establish a “Center of Excellence” for blockchain research.212 
The unifying theme among global regulators is cooperation between 
government and industry stakeholders. Unlike some of their international 
counterparts, regulators in the United States have rejected proposals to 
create their own regulatory sandboxes.213 But there are signs of public-
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private cooperation, even if they do stop short of establishing testing 
environments. In addition, the Blockchain Alliance serves as a public-
private forum for the Digital Chamber of Commerce to work with fintech 
companies to combat financial crimes that take place on blockchains.214 
B. DERIVATIVES REGULATION UNDER DODD-FRANK AND THE 
COMMODITIES EXCHANGE ACT 
Derivatives contracts operate both as hedging devices and pure 
wagers.215 Derivatives laws often struggle to find balance between these 
two uses. Regulators often seek to curb over-speculation while accepting 
the social benefits of derivatives.216 Prior to Dodd-Frank, the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) adopted a hands-off regulatory 
approach to derivatives under the Commodity Futures Modernization Act 
(“CFMA”) by excluding most OTC derivatives from regulation.217 Dodd-
Frank repudiated the CFMA and instead imposed a series of requirements 
designed to increase both market and transaction level transparency.218 
Under Dodd-Frank, derivatives are subject to a fragmented 
regulatory regime. The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) 
asserts jurisdiction over “security-based swaps,”219 which Dodd-Frank 
defines as swaps that are based on the underlying value of a security or 
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index of securities.220 The CFTC has regulatory authority over all other 
types of swaps, including agricultural swaps.221 The two agencies share 
authority over “mixed swaps,” which include components of security-
based swaps and other swaps.222 Dodd-Frank does not provide a single 
definition for the term “swap” but lists instruments that are considered 
swaps and delineates several considerations in determining whether a 
transaction is a swap.223 While the CFTC is the primary regulator, Dodd-
Frank also affords rulemaking authority to several “prudential 
regulators.” 224  The prudential regulators include the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Farm 
Credit Administration, and the Federal Housing Finance Agency.225 
Title VII’s clearing requirements represent perhaps the most 
consequential change to derivatives regulation. The Commodity 
Exchange Act (“CEA”), as amended by Dodd-Frank, now prohibits 
entering into a swap agreement unless that swap is submitted to a 
derivatives clearing organization (“DCO”) or to an exempt clearinghouse 
for clearing.226 Most DCOs must register with the CFTC. To do so, a 
registrant must comply with the CEA’s seventeen core principles.227 Once 
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registered, DCOs are subject to CFTC rules regarding the implementation 
of these principles. For example, the CFTC mandates that DCOs maintain 
sufficiently liquid resources to continue to meet their financial obligations 
notwithstanding the default of their largest clearing member.228 Agency 
rulemaking also requires DCOs to adopt procedures to contain losses in 
case of a clearing member’s default.229 
                                                                                                                                                     
5. Standards and procedures to protect member and participant funds. 
6. Efficient and fair default rules and procedures. 
7. Adequate rule enforcement and dispute resolution procedures. 
8. Adequate and appropriate systems safeguards, emergency 
procedures, and plan for disaster recovery. 
9. Obligation to provide necessary reports to allow the CFTC to 
oversee clearinghouse activities. 
10. Maintenance of all business records for five years in a form 
acceptable to the CFTC. 
11. Publication of clearinghouse rules and operating procedures. 
12. Participation in appropriate domestic and international 
information-sharing agreements. 
13. Avoidance of actions that are unreasonable restraints of trade or 
that impose anti-competitive burdens. 
14. Governance arrangements and fitness standards. 
15. Rules to minimize conflicts of interest in the DCO’s decision-
making process, and a process for resolving any conflicts. 
16. Composition of governing boards to include market participants. 
17. Well-founded legal framework for the activities of the DCO. 
Clearing Organizations, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, http://www.cftc. 
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The CEA charges the CFTC with reviewing swaps and determining 
whether they should be subject to mandatory clearing (these are called 
“designated swaps”).230 The CFTC can independently review classes of 
swaps and determine whether they should be subject to clearing; it can 
also initiate review when a DCO submits reports of swaps it plans to clear. 
The CEA lists a number of factors for the CFTC to consider in 
determining whether to designate a swap for clearing. 231  The major 
statutory exception to the CEA’s clearing requirements is known as the 
commercial end-user exception. It applies to swaps where one 
counterparty “(i) is not a financial entity; (ii) is using swaps to hedge or 
mitigate commercial risk; and (iii) notifies the Commission . . . how it 
generally meets its financial obligations associated with entering into 
non-cleared swaps.”232 The exception is designed for non-financial users 
who use the swap for hedging purposes and can sufficiently prove their 
ability to meet their obligations. Invoking this exception is optional, and 
the decision to do so rests entirely on the counterparty meeting all three 
criteria.233 
Even if a class of swaps is required for clearing and not subject to an 
exception or exemption, some highly customized OTC derivatives lack 
sufficient liquidity to be accepted for clearing. For these swaps, Dodd-
Frank requires the Prudential Regulators to propose unified margin 
requirements for uncleared swaps within their scope of authority.234 In 
addition, the CFTC and the SEC are charged with issuing their own 
margin requirements for uncleared swaps that are not subject to Prudential 
Regulator oversight.235 
Once trades are cleared, or granted an exemption, they are subject to 
Dodd-Frank’s post-trade reporting and document retention requirements. 
The amended CEA requires all swaps, whether cleared or uncleared, to 
be reported to a swap data repository (“SDR”).236 According to CFTC 
regulation, swap participants are also subject to ongoing reporting 
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obligations. At the outset, reporting parties must send electronic swap 
creation data to SDRs.237 Swap creation data includes data regarding the 
agreement’s terms. 238  In addition, reporting parties must send 
continuation data to SDRs.239 This includes data concerning any changes 
to the swap’s economic terms, including data pertaining to life cycle 
events and valuation.240 
III. BLOCKCHAIN’S IMPACT ON SYSTEMIC RISK 
Depending on the technology’s development, blockchains could 
radically revamp the market structure for derivatives trades. Existing 
regulations may not be sufficient to address the risks posed by a 
blockchain derivatives market. It is difficult, and arguably 
counterproductive, at this stage of the blockchain’s development to 
suggest concrete proposals for new rules. Instead, this part argues that 
systemic risk is the primary concern driving current derivatives regulation 
and that a new regulatory scheme must consider blockchain’s unique 
risks. This part argues that CCPs, while generally seen as an effective way 
to reduce systemic risk, partially create risk by creating large central 
entities that are subject to failure. While blockchains can reduce the risk 
of over-centralization, this part warns that blockchain technology may 
create systemic risks of a different nature. Regulators must consider these 
risks when determining how to govern blockchain markets. 
A. CENTRALIZATION AND SYSTEMIC RISK 
One of regulators’ chief concerns regarding derivatives is their role 
in enhancing financial systemic risk.241 There is no single definition for 
systemic risk. Oftentimes, it is defined according to its consequences: 
bank runs, payment crises, failures of interconnected firms, and general 
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distrust in the financial system.242 Alternatively, systemic risk may be 
expressed in terms of potential causes, such as a company being “too big 
to fail, too interconnected to fail, or too leveraged to fail.”243 
Systemic risk is traditionally associated with institutional failure. 
Banks and other financial intermediaries provide market access, so 
widespread institutional failure can increase costs of capital.244 Bank runs 
can signal institutional systemic risk.245 A panic among depositors can 
trigger requests for withdrawals, and because banking assets are primarily 
long term, banks do not hold enough cash to satisfy demands.246 This can 
force some banks into bankruptcy, but since banks often lend to one 
another, a defaulting bank can renege on its obligations to another 
institution. 247  In a panic, multiple defaults can reverberate across the 
entire industry, ultimately causing a “domino effect” of failures.248 
Despite its strengths, the central clearing model is viewed skeptically 
by many commentators. Dodd-Frank skeptics suggest that it is unclear 
whether the concentration of risk in central entities is ultimately good or 
bad for systemic risk. The blockchain’s potential to distribute tasks 
traditionally conducted by CCPs reopens the discussion about risks posed 
by centralization. 249  This worldwide mandate saddles CCPs with 
hundreds of trillions of dollars’ worth of additional trades that would not 
have required clearing prior to the financial crisis.250 
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By their very function, CCPs are inherently interconnected to 
numerous financial institutions.251 In a way, “clearing has turned out to be 
the Mother of All Interconnections, because every big financial institution 
is connected to all big CCPs, and . . . everyone has to funnel the bulk of 
their derivatives trades through clearinghouses.” 252  The CCP’s 
membership will almost invariably consist of large firms that, in turn, 
have their own large customers.253 While margin calls and loss sharing 
rules can alleviate some of the stress of a member firm’s failure, CCPs 
are still vulnerable to failures by particularly large member firms that 
serve multiple functions.254 In addition to serving as general members, 
some members serve as depository banks, custodians, and settlement 
banks.255 During a crisis, these firms must manage their own operations 
in addition to supporting the CCP with variation margins.256 
The problem is compounded by CCPs’ mandated acceptance of 
swaps that are comparatively less liquid. The relative illiquidity of certain 
types of swaps can sometimes make variation margin calculation an 
imperfect science, as the CCPs would need to introduce models into their 
pricing formulae. 257  In a worst-case scenario, multi-function clearing 
members could default and fail to meet variation margin requirements on 
time.258 As a result, the clearing mandate could leave CCPs vulnerable to 
liquidity shortages during periods of financial stress.259 Such a shortage 
would compromise the CCPs’ ability to meet their obligations towards 
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non-defaulting members. These events do not occur in a vacuum; a CCP’s 
failure to meet its obligations could undermine confidence in the markets 
in which it provides clearing services.260 Thus, its failure could very well 
result in the type of financial contagion that it was designed to protect 
against in the first place. 
The blockchain’s decentralization of clearing functions could reduce 
the risks posed by excessive centralization. One of the guiding tenets of 
the blockchain is its lack of a single point of failure. The ideal blockchain-
based system can decentralize key clearing functions and distribute those 
tasks among members of the network. Blockchain entrepreneurs are 
optimistic that smart contracts can automate integral processes including 
matching and affirmation, collateral management, default management, 
and settlement.261 The results of this could be profound, as CCPs would 
play a diminished role or even be displaced altogether. Skeptics note that 
blockchains cannot replicate every CCP process; CCPs mutualize default 
risk and manage positions in a way that blockchains presently cannot.262 
While it may currently be the case that blockchains cannot emulate the 
diverse array of CCP functions, the potential benefits of disintermediation 
could be too tantalizing to ignore. Blockchains can be incorporated into 
existing processes for efficiency gains, and industry partnerships and new 
startups are constantly pushing the technology towards greater levels of 
disintermediation. 
B. THE SYSTEMIC RISKS POSED BY DECENTRALIZED SYSTEMS 
Blockchain evangelists continue to make advancements to the 
technology through industry-wide cooperation on research. As practical 
application of the technology comes closer to fruition, the CFTC and its 
international counterparts must consider whether the current regulatory 
paradigms can apply to this new technology. If the technology lives up to 
the lofty expectations posed by some of its enthusiastic entrepreneurs, 
then certain requirements, such as mandated central clearing, could 
become obsolete. Certain markets, such as those for uncleared OTC 
swaps, would be far more transparent than they are today. 263  While 
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regulators and market participants may salivate over blockchain’s 
potential, they must also realize this change in market structure is not a 
riskless proposition. Although the risks of over-centralization are well-
documented in legal scholarship and blockchain’s disintermediation of 
settlement procedures seems to directly address those concerns, this 
decentralized structure comes with risks of its own. 
Though it may be too early to pose a new regulatory regime, there 
are some themes to evaluate when considering ways to regulate 
blockchain markets. Systemic risk will still exist in blockchain markets; 
only the sources of systemic risk will change. Decentralization of market 
intermediaries shifts regulatory concern from the systemic risks created 
by interconnected institutions to those inherent in the market itself. In 
addition, such a heavy reliance on digital trading infrastructure suggests 
that the market structure could be a source of risk. 
The CFTC should focus on its regulatory prerogative to reduce 
systemic risk, which has taken precedence since the enactment of Dodd-
Frank. 264  Regulators must account for the unique risks posed by a 
decentralized network. They can do so by addressing issues regarding 
settlement finality and recourse, especially in the context of potential 
cyberattacks on the blockchain network. In addition, regulators should be 
cognizant of the type of behavior that could arise as market participants 
take advantage of the blockchain’s efficiencies. The CFTC should remain 
vigilant in requiring reporting by swap participants. Blockchains can 
enhance this functionality if regulations are updated to allow reporting 
through the shared ledger.265 
Blockchain transactions lack certain crucial elements of traditional 
legal agreements. They are transparent and easily verifiable. For example, 
to allow communal payment verification to take place, Bitcoin attempts 
to ensure that transactions are irrevocable—no single user could reverse 
a transaction after it is entered into the blockchain ledger. But the 
unidirectional nature of these transactions becomes a liability in the event 
of a disputed transaction. Bitcoin manages to prevent illegitimate 
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payments, but this is of little use if the transfer is based on fraudulent 
pretenses to begin with.266 Even after the transaction is finalized, if a court 
orders damages arising from, for example, a fraudulent transfer, the initial 
transaction is not “undone,” per se. Instead, the party that must pay the 
damage award would initiate a new transaction in the amount owed, or 
face further judicial sanctions.267 The Bitcoin blockchain itself cannot 
resolve this problem internally; it must rely on other remedies, such as 
those imposed judicially, to deal with fraudulent transfers. 
Immutability, despite being an important part of Bitcoin 
functionality, is a malleable concept. Once a transaction is finalized and 
placed into the public ledger, a subsequent, prohibited transaction, such 
as a double spend, would fail scrutiny under the proof of work process. 
But since blockchains are, in effect, communal verification mechanisms, 
it is possible for cabals of bad actors to impose their version of the truth 
onto the network. This problem can manifest itself through the 
blockchain’s main technological vulnerability, called the “51% attack.”268 
The basic premise of this exploit is that if a single attacker or group of 
attackers controlled more than 50% of the blockchain’s computing power, 
they could produce hashes at a fast-enough rate to overwrite other users’ 
transactions. 269  Thus, a malicious user that controls 51% of the 
blockchain’s mining hash-rate could theoretically send a transaction and 
then reverse it.270 The blockchain would suggest that this malicious user 
still possessed an asset when, in fact, that asset had just been transferred. 
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Undoing blockchain errors is not a simple task. As of this writing, 
the highest profile attack and attempted resolution of a blockchain attack 
involved Ethereum. The attack on Ethereum was not a 51% attack but 
rather an exploit in the programming language that facilitates smart 
contract creation.271 This attack is perhaps the greatest security challenge 
to a cryptocurrency to date. Some observers attribute the attack to the 
flexibility Ethereum affords its users.272 While Bitcoin’s programming 
language is sufficient to effectuate relatively simple currency 
transactions, Ethereum allows users to use several languages to create 
more sophisticated agreements. 273  Some suggest that this led to 
vulnerabilities in the underlying smart contract code. 274  The attacker 
managed to drain millions of Ether from Ethereum’s largest distributed 
autonomous organization—a crowdfunding pool named, “The DAO.”275 
Users who invested in The DAO’s projects quite literally watched, on the 
blockchain, as the attacker siphoned off funds to another address.276 In an 
open letter to Ethereum’s users, the hacker took refuge in the immutability 
of the smart contract by suggesting that he or she cannot be subject to any 
additional legal obligations beyond those codified in the coded 
agreements at issue.277 
The legal merit of such a claim is far from clear, but Ethereum 
nonetheless took action by creating a “fork.”278 Ethereum blacklisted the 
offending addresses and offered a firmware update to its remaining user 
base.279 This solution effectively created two blockchains: one with the 
most recent update and another that was theoretically obsolete.280  Of 
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course, the viability of a blockchain fork depends on the users installing 
the update; Ethereum cannot compel users to do so. An attacker can 
exploit this vulnerability by promising users incentives to remain on the 
old version of the blockchain.281 The long-term effects of this solution are 
unclear. On the one hand, the hard fork splits the community, and an 
intervention of this magnitude could undermine faith in the currency 
going forward. Then again, a hard fork is perhaps the more palatable 
solution compared to the alternative of losing millions. Critics question 
how the fork will affect the perception of Ethereum and blockchains as 
secure payment mechanisms going forward, with some going so far as to 
call it a bailout.282 
The concerns about cyber-attacks and the Ethereum fork bring to 
light one of the main disputes regarding blockchains: the notion of 
settlement finality. Broadly speaking, settlement finality is the moment at 
which a transaction becomes final and irreversible. 283  Finality is 
important to financial firms because it provides certainty as to when assets 
are legally theirs.284 Parties thus rely on the concreteness of finality to 
determine asset ownership and monitor risks.285 
Blockchains challenge traditional notions of finality. As Ethereum 
founder Vitalik Buterin writes, “decentralized systems . . . may 
[definitively provide settlement finality], or they may provide it 
probabilistically, within certain economic bounds, or not at all.” 286 
Depending on the design of the blockchain, finality can be amorphous. In 
a consensus-based proof of work system, it is difficult to predict the future 
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security of a transaction that has been incorporated into a block.287 There 
is always the possibility that an actor or several actors working in concert 
could assume most of the blockchain’s mining power, giving them the 
ability to rewrite blocks and undo previously settled transactions. 288 
While the term “51% attack” likely evokes images of an attack by a flood 
of hackers, such an attack need not originate from external actors. 
Consider Bitcoin’s blockchain, where the difficulty of the proof of work 
problem largely depends on the network assigning a target value.289 The 
blockchain sets the target value, and this determines the difficulty of the 
proof of work problem. Recall that Bitcoin assigns the target according to 
the number of miners on the network; the proof of work problem thus 
becomes more difficult as more people connect to the network and 
become stakeholders. 290  This creates a situation where the “level of 
security . . . is directly proportional to the future value of the token, which 
is unknowable.” 291  As the difficulty of the proof of work problem 
changes, transactions may become easier (or more difficult) to reverse. 
Many blockchain stakeholders suggest that using private or 
consortium blockchains sufficiently mitigates this problem. Bitcoin and 
Ethereum use public blockchains, allowing any person with a computer 
to download the client, participate in the mining process, and read the 
ledger. 292  The consensus process and the determination of the 
blockchain’s truth is left up to the public via cryptography and economic 
incentives.293 Conversely, private blockchains tightly control access via a 
central administrator.294 The administrator can distribute read permissions 
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(the ability to view the blockchain) to pre-approved parties.295 Ultimately, 
however, only the administrator can write (or input) new transactions to 
the blockchain. 296  Consortium blockchains serve as something of a 
middle ground between the two extremes: they allow consensus by 
permitting only a certain number of trusted nodes to engage in the 
verification process.297 Because a consortium blockchain requires some 
element of pre-screening and familiarity among participants in the 
consensus process, members can hold one another accountable for 
modifications to the ledger. Consortium blockchains cannot completely 
resolve finality issues, however. For example, a blockchain cannot 
prevent collusion among members of a settlement consortium.298 There 
are historical examples of collusion among financial firms, including the 
notable and relatively recent case of LIBOR rate manipulation among 
London banks.299 
The lack of transaction finality can be a major source of systemic 
risk in a decentralized system. As disintermediation occurs, systemic risk 
“should increasingly be viewed by its impact on markets, not 
institutions.”300 Risks of this nature increase costs of capital for market 
participants, even if an initial shock occurs at an institution that is not a 
major source of market access.301 Ideally, financial institutions insulate 
themselves from risk through diversification; they invest in assets that 
have a negative correlation, or no correlation, to each other and the 
market.302 The net result should be a portfolio that has little to no net risk. 
A market-based systemic risk can be positively correlated with the 
market. For example, Steven Schwarcz considers the near-failure of the 
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infamous hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management (“LTCM”) as an 
illustration of this type of risk. While LCTM perhaps suffered from some 
“hubris” by taking on increasing amounts of leverage, its diversified 
positions ultimately failed “as the entire market moved in the same 
direction at the same time.”303 Thus, instead of its losses being offset, they 
were magnified and transmitted to its counterparties through its 
derivatives positions.304 
A lack of finality is a type of systemic risk that affects the market. 
Without a clearly defined moment of finality, it may be difficult to 
determine liability if a participant in a blockchain agreement suffers 
insolvency.305 The Bank for International Settlements’ Core Principles for 
Systemically Important Payment Systems call for definitive finality 
because participants can face liquidity risk if they are unable to transfer 
the settlement asset for another claim.306 This can have systemic effects 
because “all participants holding the settlement asset are [simultaneously 
exposed to liquidity risk] and . . . market participants can have little 
control over the timing and size of their holding of the settlement asset.”307 
In adopting its own settlement finality directive, the then European 
Commission recognized that without definitive finality, the insolvency of 
a single participant could cause liquidity concerns across an entire 
payment, which would in turn undermine confidence in the entire 
market.308 Ensuring definitive finality can be a way to foster confidence 
in markets309 and prevent the positively correlated market movements that 
would occur from a loss in confidence (which would render hedging 
positions ineffective). 
Regulators can provide clarity around finality. While it is perhaps 
too early in the blockchain’s technological life to create a new and 
specifically tailored regime for settlement finality, it is possible to 
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envision ways in which the current regulatory regime can adapt to 
changes in market infrastructure. Regulators cannot rest on their laurels 
and expect the blockchain to resolve every problem. To the contrary, in 
some ways, it appears that decentralizing clearing and settlement 
processes substitutes one type of systemic risk for another. Under a 
centralized clearing structure, the primary source of systemic risk stems 
from a crucial intermediary’s exposure to other institutions. In a 
decentralized and distributed blockchain system, systemic risks will 
likely come from losses in market confidence caused by disputes in 
finality. 
The idea that regulators could serve as limited permission nodes on 
the blockchain is commonly floated among the blockchain community.310 
This potentially gives regulators access to a wealth of data that they would 
otherwise not have, even under the current reporting regime. The ledger 
itself can serve as the record for swap transactions, and can store both 
creation and ongoing data required by the CFTC’s reporting rules.311 This 
arrangement can result in major efficiencies. Currently, there are four 
CFTC-registered SDRs, each of which uses different software and 
reporting architecture, making it difficult for the CFTC to aggregate and 
analyze data. 312 A blockchain consisting of prominent market participants 
could comply with the requirements and provide transparency in the form 
of viewable, standardized data.313 
The nature of blockchains and the potential risk factors associated 
with their use suggest that regulators may need to be even more proactive 
in adapting the current regulatory scheme to the emerging technology. 
Mitigating systemic risk in blockchain systems will likely require 
regulators to set new standards for the underlying smart contracts. This 
may require the CFTC and other agencies to take a hands on approach to 
cyber security issues and problems relating to the blockchain’s 
technological infrastructure. 
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Smart contracts and blockchains are financial innovations that 
regulators must stay ahead of. If derivatives markets move to blockchain 
architecture, counterparties could adopt new types of agreements. While 
financial innovation is typically thought of in terms of the development 
of new products, advances in market structure can achieve the same result. 
Financial innovation can occur when there are changes in markets and 
intermediaries that affect the way that counterparties manage risk.314 This 
is founded in Ronald Coase’s economic theory, which suggests that firms 
and markets are substitutes for economic production and that, without 
transaction costs, economic production would occur entirely through 
markets.315 New products create ways for actors to move their risks to 
markets; while bespoke at first, the market’s demand for these instruments 
leads to standardized, liquid forms of these arrangements.316 
Thus, a fundamental change to the market’s technological 
infrastructure could also be characterized as financial innovation in this 
sense. The blockchain promises to simplify the creation of new 
instruments. Swap creators can easily emulate the term structures of other 
securities and use the blockchain’s computational power to automatically 
make appropriate margin adjustments. Blockchain’s proponents suggest 
that this will lead to the creation of new types of agreements, allowing 
firms to transfer new types of risk.317 While this provides a way for firms 
to move more risks off their balance sheets, the usual result of financial 
innovation is information asymmetry between market participants and 
regulators.318 Typically, the source of the asymmetry is the regulators’ 
inability to ascertain the risks posed by these new instruments; 
standardization can be a way to reduce these asymmetries. 319 
Blockchains, however, provide something of a twist to this formula. 
Regulators can mitigate some of the risks posed by the terms of the new 
instruments by serving as nodes, but the contract’s code can serve as a 
new source of risk. 
Until smart contracts become industry staples, the CFTC should 
closely scrutinize them. ISDA currently plays a prominent role in contract 
standardization, but smart contracts may necessitate an additional level of 
review in their early lives. The Ethereum situation is an interesting case 
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study in the potential pitfalls of smart contract vulnerability. Since the 
hack occurred relatively recently, the long-term effects on user 
confidence in the Ethereum network are unclear. But given the potentially 
systemic repercussions that the lack of finality can have on the market, 
regulators may not want to take risks with the new technology. One way 
to cut off a source of risk would be to regulate the smart contracts 
themselves, in the same way that CFTC regulation compels reporting of 
swap terms to SDRs. The unique risks posed by smart contracts may 
additionally require the CFTC to review the underlying smart contract 
code to screen for vulnerabilities. 
CONCLUSION 
Blockchain technology is still very much evolving. Both finance 
firms and regulators are still exploring the specific ways in which 
blockchains can benefit capital markets. At this stage, it is perhaps best 
that regulators allow the technology to develop in its natural course. At 
the same time, it would benefit regulators to remain on the legal cutting 
edge by understanding the potential promises and pitfalls of the 
technology. The efficiencies provided by blockchains are substantial, as 
they could reduce transaction costs across the board for derivatives 
market participants. They can also remove or reduce reliance on central 
counterparties that are exposed to large amounts of credit risk. But 
blockchains are not without problems of their own. Technological 
vulnerabilities can create new systemic risks, which regulators must be 
prepared to mitigate before a financial crisis occurs. The specifics of any 
prophylactic measures will largely depend on how the technology 
develops, but what is clear right now is that an analysis of blockchains’ 
systemic risks will likely require an understanding of data and code as 
much as of finance and the law. 
 
